punkalouver, in all your argumentation, you continously overlook, that the topic of this threat is the discussion on TCAS philosophies. This cannot be limited to the teaching material published by any organisation.
I wonder - if you really have read the Eurocontrol bulletins as you said you have, why hasn't it occured to you, that all the cases published there have one causal factor in common: TCAS. Some of the problems described are related to training, but some of them seem to be very hard to mitigate, e.g. the interception of a A340 by a military jet transmitting altitude information described in Bulletin 9. Apart from changing the practice by the airforce there seems to be little, that can prevent this kind of incident from happening. What strikes me in this incident is, that only the disregard of the A340 crew to follow the TCAS RA when reaching critical altitude led to a reversal RA. TCAS could have noticed that the intruder (airforce) was not acting according to the TCAS logic and could have issued a reversal earlier - but this will be solved in TCAS 7.1 as Eurocontrol promised.
Interestingly enough, you quote the BFU report but seem not to recognise, that the first point stated by the BFU report under "systematic causes" (page 119 in the german version) is the insufficient integration of TCAS into the aviation system.