Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[walter kennedy]

To anyone trying to fathom out what may have happened here I cannot emphasise enough the importance of the reference to a large scale chart or map with the critical points marked as accurately as possible and with the right magnetic variation of the time applied to any bearings (a contemporary air chart would be a bonus) – it is worth the effort as many things would be so much clearer – an example is the situation that they were in at the position where the waypoint (in the SuperTANS) was changed (for brevity WPCHX hereon).
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There seems to be a perception that, at WPCHX, if waypoint B (corresponding to Corran) had been actually used and the steer information to it had been enacted that the change of course to B, at that point, would have got them out of trouble.
This was not the case as the bearing to B at WPCHX was 020M – which would have had them heading for the very highest part of the Mull.
Further, to have continued to waypoint A before turning towards B would have obviously had the same result.
The literal route from Aldergrove to waypoint A then B was not on at such a low level whatever the conditions – A could only have been an aiming point (for the sea crossing) to get to near the light house in VFR conditions (the “official” line) or they had some purpose to go in there.
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To have cleared the high ground (of the Mull) by turning before waypoint A to the (direct) bearing to B (Corran) would have required action over 6 nautical miles before WPCHX.
Simple pre-flight chart work, when presumably they selected their waypoints, would have told them this – they would have known that, as close in as WPCHX, if they had changed their mind about getting close to the landmass, a turn of at least 15 deg left would have been required.
Bearing in mind that they should have been able to see the Mull (mist on the slopes and topped with a low orographic cloud – very nasty to approach without good reason) from a long way off, it seems strange on a ferry flight to have left the decision point so late (WPCHX is damn close in) which would have required effectively some back tracking.
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While in good conditions it would seem entirely reasonable to go to the Mull and then “handrail” up the coast for a variety of reasons, it seems strange given the local weather on the Mull that they simply did not turn to Corran earlier in which case they would have not had any worries about high ground for another 30 miles or so – and even at that point, a small deviation along the Sound of Jura would have allowed the whole trip to have been completed at really low level if required (also not forgetting that the general cloud base in the region was significantly higher than the local orographic loud on the Mull itself and so even this deviation may not have been necessary).
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Given that they were in a hurry (or so it has been so often alleged), it is also surprising that, if this was a straightforward ferry flight, they did not route to Corran directly because the dog leg to the Mull was a significant excursion – if the weather had cleared, they would still have had a good view of the Mull.
Plotting on a large scale map or chart makes this obvious.
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So there is a problem with the scenario of them just getting into trouble near the Mull while on a simple ferry flight as, according to the logic above, there would appear to have been a decision point much before WPCHX and there is no suggestion of malfunction or distraction back then.
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Further, given that they were making a change of waypoint so close in, not only did they not steer away left but they steered right a whopping 8 degrees.
The track from WPCHX to initial impact was a beeline at 035M – which was the course setting on the handling pilot’s HSI.
This (as I have argued in previous posts) would suggest that the course change to 035M was deliberate and unhurried (in an emergency, would you fiddle with a course selector?).
What was on that heading? – no navaid AFAIK.
Some may say they had decided to go to high level and therefore more directly – but the bearing to Inverness was not 035M. Besides, there are many reasons put forward on other occasions that the alleged attempt to climb over was nonsense so I won’t go into that here – I will take it that they were not.
So why would the handling pilot (the driver) have a course setting of 035M on his main nav instrument? And what data could it have been acting on? (You would normally have something like a TANS waypoint or VOR driving your track bar on the HSI otherwise why bother with the course selector.)
The one thing that waypoint A and 035M have in common is that they both get you towards that landing area that I have referred to previously - but of course waypoint A had been de-selected.
Could there have been anything else thereabouts for them to have been using that day?