Globally, you provide another interesting viewpoint of operations at Quito.
Viewing the situation with a wider perspective wouldn’t it be better to fix the problems at their root as opposed to finding a risky work-around, which not everyone would know of or be able to fly.
For example, remove the rubber deposits, provide a warning about volcanic ash, and if required declare the runway ‘slippery when wet’.
A more extensive solution would be to move the ILS GS origin and increase the angle.
If hazards are encountered it is everyone’s duty to report them; I suggest starting with a company safety report, then ASRS or equivalent (copy to your ops liaison at Quito and/or email this thread to them).
bsieker you explain the reasons why a ‘W-B analysis’ is limited – thanks. This is similar to a formal accident report where the absence of fact limits the conclusions as to cause and contributing aspects. An alternative approach is pure speculation; TowerDog proposes mechanical failure, but without supporting fact.
However, there is often great value in risk or hazard based speculation for preventing similar accidents; as BOAC states, providing preventative factors.
Mechanical failure is unlikely on a statistical basis (low probability but not impossible), whereas risk from human error would be high. This is not to focus on the crew; HF considerations would include all humans in the operational system, e.g. who provides and/or checks the chart information – LDA, PAPI alignment?
An example of risk based speculation might consider operational reasons for the long landing distance. We do not know where the aircraft touched down, but the discussion on duck under / unstable approach identifies with considerable risk. If operators duck under we could consider if they (operators/authority) have fully understood the risks in the manoeuvre particularly at high altitude – high GS. Or if crews duck under do they understand the risks; it is not an individual’s error (PF) it is a crew issue. Do monitoring pilots (PNF) concur with the error or do they even detect it. We could then investigate why the crew exhibit these behaviours – knowledge of the risk, training, SOPs, human issues in the organisation.
Do crews brief the specific differences in this type of operation? E.g. it is more likely that the landing weight is near limiting performance, particularly with a wet runway / tailwind. Do crew consciously decide to change the way they decelerate the aircraft or just rely on the standard Auto Brake setting accepting that they will to stop further down the runway? The risk here is that although a safe landing should still be achieved, the safety margins are reduced – perhaps just to the point where a slick, wet, rubber coated, portion of the runway is the difference between tarmac and grass. Perhaps a change of brief for the use of brakes or heightened awareness would be valuable.
Thus from a small selective risk based speculation, there could be many avenues of research or opportunities for operators to check their understanding of the issues; providing preventative factors and improving safety – reducing their risk of an overrun.