Def Stan 05-130 & Airworthiness
Section 12 of this Def Stan sets out very comprehensively the experience, knowledge and professional qualifications required of personnel employed under this Maintenance Approved Organisation Scheme. Quite rightly so, and any engineer reading this, from apprentice upwards, will understand this. After all, Kinloss, you don’t just grab the nearest administrator when you want an aircraft signed off, do you?
It may or may not come as a surprise to you that similar requirements are not enforced in, for example, DE&S (or PE, AMSO, AML, DLO, DPA before it) when implementing their airworthiness and type approval obligations. There are some highly respected aviators here who know me very well from one particular major aircraft project, and know I spent the best part of 5 years keeping a beady eye on my non-technical boss who was in the habit of granting technical approval, signing off designs, changes, modifications etc off his own back. Unfortunately, one of the designs he sought to implement, but I managed to over-rule at the last minute, was implemented after I left (by whom, I do not know). The BoI condemned the system as unfit for purpose.
I won’t name names obviously; I do believe he thought he was acting for the best. Suffice to say, what I describe is not unusual and I’ve seen it in other IPTs/MDGs. My point is; the “robust regulatory framework” didn’t work. Grossly inexperienced and unsuitable staffs are in unprecedented positions of authority, and woe betide anyone who challenges them. I feel able to relate the tale, as the DG/XD (same one as Nimrod & Chinook) and CDP were content, confirmed under FoI.
I cannot see the situation improving, largely because MoD are actively getting rid of the very engineers they need, so I whole heartedly agree with Chug’s call for a move to an independent airworthiness authority for military aircraft.