TCAS, IFF etc
TCAS, IFF etc
I am glad to see this mentioned on a thread whose focus, as a result of the release under FoI of the QQ report, has shifted slightly to encompass and consider the appalling catalogue of airworthiness failures it reveals. And remember, these are not revelations. EVERY single adverse comment in the report has been notified before. And rejected, so it’ll be interesting to see the MoD reaction. I think this thread is, at last, drawing all this together.
It is important to realise that DE&S (DPA + DLO) does not have thousands of people working on military aviation. It is actually a quite small community, headed by a few. Those few increasingly rely on an important aspect of achieving and maintaining airworthiness, called “retention of Corporate memory”. Experience. Competence. Upkeep of standards. And so on. (All things referred to by QQ as missing, to varying degrees, on Nimrod support). But, just as the report damns the exodus of experience from the RAF, the equivalent experience is being ejected from DE&S. Every loss of an experienced engineer, undermines the airworthiness foundations. And means money has to be diverted to pay premium rates elsewhere.
Few here would disagree that a serviceable and functional (two different things) IFF is vital. Think Tornado/Patriot – the BoI report is available on the MoD site. Consider also that the above staffs have formally ruled that neither necessary. Then, ask if the same people are making similar absolutely barking decisions concerning other safety and airworthiness issues. I simply refer you to the QQ report.
You may recall that earlier this year the MoD in-house rag trumpeted SIFF in these terms – “Latest Puma changes will cut friendly fire risk”. Well done, I say, to the IPTL. But I wonder if he knew that various DGs, CDP and Mins(AF) had specifically ruled to the contrary. Who would you rather have responsible for your safety?
These events/subjects are all linked.