But I have a feeling in my water about this one.
I too wonder whether this will be the one ?
For my last few years working in the MoD, with most of the fixed and rotary wing in-Service IPTs, it was apparent that safety and airworthiness management was in an appalling state. Not just in the IPTs though, but the organisations that were intended to support them. In ADRP (as was) DASC, AD Engineering Policy, the DESB, DASB FWAMG/HAMG etc, there was virtually no understanding of airworthiness and safety. An acquaintance of mine wrote a damning report on the MoD's competence to self regulate, it did not make good reading and it’s distribution any further was blocked. We often talked about a big event (catastrophe) that might change things within the MoD, and I think, finally, that this may be it. XV179 was not enough, the MoD has been able to wriggle and squirm because enemy fire was involved. But the loss of XV230 could have happened during any AAR sortie. The loss of XW666 was also very close to being that catastrophe, although I suspect that management of airworthiness and safety had not descended to such a level of ineptitude.
The information that is coming out now, and the management of the fleet following the loss of XV230 and all her crew is damning. It calls into question the competence, and the leadership of the very top levels of the MoD and the RAF.
The MoD’s privilege of self regulation should be withdrawn forthwith. It was a privilege that was put in place decades ago when the organisation had a core of design and airworthiness expertise. That core has gone, possibly irrecoverably, the right to self regulate is long past its sell by date.
And yes, I am a Specialist in this field !
Safety_Helmut