Bingo Handjob
You asked me;
"Do you know if the Nimrod publications are out of date?"
Yes. I've formally complained about it. The point I made above is that most Tech Pubs are not unique to one aircraft. Yes, the Nimrod MR2 has a suite of unique pubs for the airframe etc, but an awful lot of the aircraft equipment is common to other types. The failure to maintain a single equipment AP can adversely affect many aircraft.
This is compounded by the stovepiping in the MoD. I have managed programmes where, as part of risk reduction, I've had the aircraft data set assessed for currency (which really annoys people). Invariably it's grossly out of date, by years, not months (that's why they were annoyed, they were found out). Tough **** I say, they don't sign for airworthiness. But, I am only given funding to update MY pubs. And MY equipment. (And only if I ask for it and make a good enough case, which is where experience and competence in IPTs comes in. If you don't know to ask, or what to ask, you don't get). If other aircraft are affected (i.e. their equipment is out of date or lacks functionality because the pubs were outdated) all I can do is advise the other IPTs, as the process in not a centralised function anymore. Invariably they don't do anything, so different aircraft will be carrying the same equipment, but at different build standards. This matters little on a one off basis for Class C and D mods, but does (by definition) for Class A and B. The cumulative effect can be disastrous, particularly in a system of systems.
You will also appreciate that equipment at grossly different build standards, yet bearing the same NATO Stock No, can and does migrate between aircraft types. I've seen other countries complain about our aircraft lacking important functionality and interoperability precisely because of this. And in an aircraft like Nimrod it is entirely possible for crew stations to have different functionality for this reason. Come to think of it, that's what they were complaining about..... And then there's the simulators/RCTs etc. Very often they are ignored altogether. Stovepiped again. And so on. Not a big deal in isolation you may think, but just occasionally the cumulative effect and years of neglect causes events to conspire against you.
I'd go further and say that the risk classification matrix used to assess safety case risks and hazards (Criticality vs Probability) should be reassessed. It assumes a constant - that the build standard is maintained. This is NOT a constant - it is highly variable, and I would hazard a guess that some risks currently classed as "B" would change to "A". That is, given the outcome is "Catastrophic" should the event occur, you would only need to raise the probability from "Remote" to "Occasional" for the clasification to change from B to A. And that is defined as unacceptable, intolerable and should lead to grounding. When the fleet was 30+, one loss may be tolerable, barely. But when it happens in a fleet of 12, does this perception change? I'm not privvy to the flying rate but I'd definitely ask the question.
May I recommend you glance at this. Dated 1998, it is fair warning of the problem to MoD (if they needed it).
http://www.publications.parliament.u.../300/30003.htm
In it, there are references to various aircraft which, in a management sense (i.e. same people involved) are closely related to Nimrod. That is, management sets the tone. Any decision affects a wide range of aircraft and equipment. And one of the decisions was - there is no need to maintain the build standard, which includes safety. CDP is asked a very specific question on the general subject (Configuration Control) - see "Cost of Modifications" section. He was, shall we say, economical with the truth; made possible in part by the question being too specific. And, as ever, the Committee doesn't follow up to see if his promises were met.
Sorry for the length of reply, but this is a very complex subject, and one often ignored.