No speed restriction,
Here is a Swiss AAIB
report on a RJ100 which confimrs that RJ's are not immune from fumes.
Here are some extracts:
Behaviour of crew when confronted with smell and fumes in the cockpit
According to the statement by the commander of LX 1103, he realised the serious incapacitation of the co pilot due to the smell and fumes. A flight attendant was called into the cockpit to verify if smell and fumes were also perceptible in the cabin. The flight attendant replied in the negative, but at the same time pointed out that he too noticed the smell and fumes in the cockpit.
In view of the adverse effect on the co pilot it would have been appropriate for the commander to don the oxygen mask as well. This is supported by the fact that the copliots condition worsened right away again, when he tried to breathe without the mask.
The medical examination of the co pilot the next day indicated a distinct adverse effect on the vocal chords and bronchial tubes as a result of a toxic exposure.
It is striking that the crew which reported the incident on 18th April 2005 likewise did not don their oxygen masks. As an explanation the crew stated in their report: " ....and the situation was not dramatic we decided to continue the approach and set the priority on a stable approach and safe landing. Therefore no emergency was declared and the oxygen masks were not used".
When one considers the effects of smell and fumes/smoke in a cockpit, this behaviour is incomprehensible in both cases, not least because the airlines corresponding procedures in the OM A do not allow any discretion. They state that the crew must always expect the worst case scenario and consequently must don their oxygen masks in all cases.
The necessity of this basic procedural rule is also underlined by the fact that the Emergency checklist regarding "SMOKE. FUMES OR FIRE ON FLIGHT DECK/PASSENGER CABIN/ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT BAY / ANIMAL BAY" prescribes the donning of oxygen masks as the first item that has to be performed by heart.
The fact that in the case of LX 1103 and the preceding flight on 18th April 2005 this checklist was not implemented is understandable in view of the history of the flight and the current flight phase. However, implementation of the first item on the check list, ie donning oxygen masks, would have been appropriate in each case.
Conclusions:
3.1.1 Technical aspects:
Smell and fumes in the cockpit occurred during operation of HB-IXN before the serious incident.
The aircraft was released for flight operations several times, even though the defect had not been rectified.
3.1.2 Crew
The co pilot was limited in his capability of acting during the approach and landing due to the effects of fumes.
The commander did not don his oxygen mask.
The medical examination of the co pilot after the flight showed that during the toxic exposure took place.
The medical examination of the commander after the flight did not show any results.
3.2 Cause
The serious incident is attributable to the fact that on approach to Zurich Airport the cockpit filled with fumes which caused a toxic effect, leading to a limited capability of acting of the co pilot.
These fumes were caused by an oil leak as a result of a bearing damage in engine # 1. The indicators for impending bearing damage were not correctly interpreted before the incident. This incident is interesting for a variety of reasons:
If #'s 1 or 2 engine seals go, the flight deck gets it.
if #'s 3 or 4 the cabin gets it.
Co pilot incapacitated. Showed toxic poisoning the next day.
Commander OK, no toxic effects.
Fumes had been present for some 3 days before the incident...
Both the BAe 146 / RJ series have had no end of fume events over the years.
The effects are NOT short lived either, many people have lost their health and now passengers are begining to report similar ill health symptoms.
Officially, extensive ill health is NOT caused by these fumes. But when is society going to admit it?
DB
