Originally Posted by aviador novato
I think the best solution would be a continuous effort of delimitation of responsabilities through regulation. .............
I will give you an example that relates to the GOL 1907/Legacy collision:
Well, I sympathise with your suggestion that a clearer delimitation of responsibilities might help against criminalisation, but in such a project I would worry that the systems science would be overridden by political considerations. For example, in the German legal system there is a clear delimitation of responsibilities: the people at the "pointy end" of the Lathen Maglev accident are being prosecuted, whereas the managers who decided against incorporating service vehicles into the technical protection system are not being prosecuted. But whichever way it goes, someone is still being prosecuted.
Your specific suggestions in the wake of the GOL/Legacy collision suffer, if I may say so, from a significant lack of understanding of how air traffic control operates. This is not the place for me to write a tutorial on ATC, but please bear the following in mind.
* I have been flying IFR for 23 years (although not recently). In this time, I have almost never had a "cleared as filed" pre-take-off clearance, and I cannot recall ever flying the clearance I was given pre-take-off; there are always en-route changes. The idea that a pilot can be given a pre-take-off clearance that will take himher to the destination free of modification is a pipe dream. It is also unnecessary, as the next point shows.
* The system in the U.S. deals with 85,000 movements a day, which amounts to some 25-30 million movements a year. Let's assume that has grown from (I guess) 15 million movements in, say, 1987. That is of the order of 10^9 movements total since 1987, *without a collision between two aircraft flying under IFR*. (There have been collisions between IFR and VFR aircraft, but that is a different matter, since we are talking here about revising the system of clearances). That is an *extremely good safety record* by any standards (O(10^9) is the Holy Grail of highly-reliably-system designers). One simply doesn't propose to change such a system radically, as you are. One proposes to bolster its identified weaknesses.
* Some of the suggestions you make just don't seem to make sense (for example, what is a "correct" clearance? A clearance is an ATC promise to keep a certain block of airspace clear of other controlled aircraft for a certain period of time; what is a "correct" promise? Accepting a clearance is likewise a promise to maintain one's AC in that block during that time). Others are impractical (not only imagining that the system can be managed quasi-statically, but also imagining that pilots can check whether the clearance they get conforms to local ATC procedures, which can be very complicated: that is why controllers are licenced for specific control jobs).
PBL