Papa Whisky Alpha wrote:
However - in the case of XV230, if it subsequently transpires that the manufacturer had advised fire suppressant measures which were not implemented on the grounds of cost then it shows a remarkable lack of appreciation of the level of risk posed to those flying the aircraft and a low level of risk management. Should it be shown that the hazard was identified but a conscious decision was taken to ignore it on commercial, financial or political grounds, that is criminal.
I have seen documentary evidence from BAE Systems clearly recommending the fire suppressant measures which were subsequently not implemented on cost grounds, there is no 'if it subsequently transpires', the evidence is in black and white, it happened.
Airsound wrote:
Catastrophes like this are vanishingly rare, whether in military or civilian operations, mostly because all the possible causes have been foreseen, considered and dealt with. When this rarest of events does occur, it is surely unlikely to be because of something totally unforeseen - but rather because a known, recognised risk has been miscalculated, or worse, ignored.
I have seen documentary evidence from BAE Systems making reference to ignition sources (electrical and hot air) being in conflict with fuel systems. The same report states that the risks are low but covers that by saying that the low number of flying hours means a meanigful assessment of risk is not possible!
SpannerSpinner
Rib 7 fuel leaks are linked with underwing stores (Boz etc) as eluded to in the report but what do they have to do with the cause of the crash?
As a very recent MR2 man I'd be astonished (although I am ready to be corrected) if they were the main cause of the crash.
I have seen d
ocumentary evidence from BAE Systems that Rib 7 had fuel leakage problems and specifically the use of the Boz Pod exacerbated the problem and worsened the leaks.
I've also been told by RAF sources that fuel leaking from the Nimrod wings (not Rib 7) could run along the underside of the wing and pool in the bomb bay, not specifically on 230 but in previous incidents so there does seem to be a precedent.
Mick Smith wrote:
It was reconvened after it emerged that the Kinloss Station Commander had warned in August 2005 - in the wake of the burst hot air pipe on XV227 - that an “unexpected failure” was likely on Nimrod given that it was already 10 years past its out-of-service date.
The most sensible interpretation of reconvening to look at the XV227 case is that the BOI’s remit did not go back that far. What is more puzzling is why its remit did not include the discussions covered in the emails, which ran from December 2005 to February 2006 and centred on the need to get XV230’s leak problems fixed.
Maybe the BoI didn't ask for the emails or didn't know to ask for them, maybe they asked for them but were told they didn't exist. Whatever, someone at Kinloss obviously thought they were significant enough to risk their career by leaking them.
SirPeterhardingsLovechild wrote:
Would Nimrod electrical wiring pass modern standards of 'Wiring Husbandry' checks (post TWA explosion)?
Is the suspect cooling pack pipe, or any joints of that pipework, anywhere near electrical wiring?
I have seen documentary evidence from BAE Systems making reference to wiring chaffing because its too close to moving parts, arching because of the chaffing, also reference to the continued use of Kapton wiring in the Nimrod systems. Further refernce to hot air pipes being too close to fuel pipes etc
Pontius wrote:
This is possibly the service that TD has performed, lifting the carpet and letting light into areas that some people may have wished to avoid being brought to light.
BINGO !