The second is that if criminal proceedings in the wake of accidents persistently and pervasively miss the mark, as we know they do from many other cases besides Linate, then there is a case for a general moratorium on criminal proceedings until there is some means of ensuring that the "wrong" people do not get blamed. This is why, for example, the Governor of Illinois, while a death-penalty supporter, instituted a moratorium on executions until the courts can be sure that no mistakes are made.
PBL,
The debate is indeed very interesting.
I think that part of the problem has its roots in the lack of an effort (or visibility of such an effort) for a sufficiently extensive, precise and continuosly improved (in its objectiveness and clarity) set of rules to be followed by controllers, pilots and aviation industry managers in general.
It might seem wrong by some but if people in the Judiciary don't see a quest for accountability and clear delimitation of responsabilities in such a safety critical industry like aviation then we unfortunately will continue to see this trend of excessive "criminalization" of conducts after each accident.
Prosecutors and judges will keep forcing the industry to seek clear rules for the delimitation of the responsabilities of all parties involved. I very much doubt that a moratorium on criminal prosecutions would be accepted by those guys.
I think the best solution would be a continuous effort of delimitation of responsabilities through regulation. The directives should be more detailed on the procedures and ON THE RESPONSABILITIES of all the players envolved regarding those procedures.
This would prevent irresponsable criminal lawsuits when a given situation wasnīt foreseen by such very precise and exact regulations.
I will give you an example that relates to the GOL 1907/Legacy collision:
a) Controllers should give exact, standardized and CORRECT (as to altitude, etc) clearances to pilots on departure and ask for confirmation. If there is some change in a previously filed flight plan, then they should make this circumstance explicit;
b) Pilots should ask for confirmation and question non-standardized clearances;
c) Depending on the number of monitored a/cs, parallel situations, etc, a controller should have a maximum time allowed for the delay to order a necessary FL change (when an a/c enters a giver airway, for example) AND NOT KEEP WAITING UNTIL THE TWO A/Cs ARE TOO CLOSE AND CONTACT WITH ONE OF THEM IS LOST AND HE CANīT ORDER A FL CHANGE TO EITHER AIRCRAFT BECAUSE HE IS NOT SURE ABOUT ONE OF THE ACs FL ANYMORE AS ITS TRANSPONDER IS OFF (AND AS STATED HE CANī'T CONTACT THIS A/C BY RADIO TO CONFIRM ITS FL THE OLD FASHIONED WAY - excuse me for the capital letters ) ;
d) ATC authorities should provide a minimum infraestructure regarding personnel, hardware and software as well as the organization of ATC itself (don't you ask me to put the details here, but it should be detailed);
e) The a/c crew should have a minimum knowledge of a given aircraft and constantly monitor the warnings given by the a/c system, like those relating to transponder and TCAs activity. This should be extensive detailed for a given a/c model;
f) The a/c crew should be given a set of frequencies (including alternative ones) to use in a given sector and should keep and use it when necessary;
etc.
If the regulations established those specific and detailed procedures and "duties" in the future (if they are pertinent or not is another story) then everything out of such circumstances would be likely to block any criminal procedure.
The problem now is that it seems that the rules aren't clear and detailed enough and, what is even worse, it seems that people out there in the aviation industry are not that concerned with it as they should be.
