A Swiss court's decision to find four air traffic controllers guilty of negligent homicide over a 2002 mid-air collision that killed 71, mainly Russian children, has bought into sharp focus the intense debate over aviation accident blame.
Three managers were sentenced to one-year suspended prison terms, while a project manager was fined. The four employees of
Skyguide -the air traffic control company- were found responsible for the July 1, 2002 collision of a
Bashkirian Airlines TU-154 and a
DHL 757 cargo aircraft over Uerberlingen in southern Germany. The two cargo pilots and everyone on the passenger plane were killed.
The air traffic controller on duty, Peter Nielsen, was later stabbed to death in front of his family by a Russian whose wife and children had died in the crash.
Prosecutors claimed that a culture of negligence and lack of risk awareness were contributors to the accident and that it was not solely Nielsen's fault.
But more than 100 years of flight has taught the aviation industry one unshakeable truth -virtually no accidents are caused by failures of individuals, but are the result of a conflux or alignment of multiple contributory system failures.
Yet it was the Russian Captain's decision to ignore repeated warnings from his traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) to climb to avoid the
DHL plane that was the direct cause of the accident.
In aviation where most accidents are caused by "human error", it is imperative that the industry understands -as quickly as possible in a free and open exchange- what circumstances conspired to cause humans to err.
Working against that ideal is the passion in many countries to charge those responsible -typically pilots or air traffic controllers- with a criminal offence.
According to Sidney Dekker, from the
Swedish Centre for Human Factors at the Linkoping Institute of Technology, "it is critical to understand why people did what they did, rather than judging them for not doing what we now know they should have done".
Alarmingly, the list of accidents where the opposite view is taken is growing and the long-term negative impact is being felt across the industry.
The increase in the criminalisation of airline accidents -most recently highlighted by the prosecution of the air traffic controllers and pilots in the 737 mid-air collision in Brazil in September last year- is "profoundly disturbing and threatens the extraordinary safety record of the airline industry",
Flight Safety Foundation President Bill Voss says. The Foundation is leading the industry charge for the decriminalisation of airline accidents.
In an unprecedented move, it joined with the
Royal Aeronautical Society and
Acadamie Nationele de l'Air et de l'Espace on October 18 last year to issue a 5-point resolution calling for the establishment of causes and contributory factors to be the first priority following aviation accidents, rather than the criminal pursuit of aviation employees.
At the same time, the safety foundation points out that even an organisation that promotes a "no blame" culture cannot tolerate irresponsible or careless acts, such as has happened with several pilots caught -on the flight deck- under the influence of alcohol.
The airline industry, Voss says, has demonstrated that with a free flow of safety information -combined with technological advances- enormous strides have been made in airline safety.
Since 1960, the crash rate of jet aircraft has improved from 60 accidents per million departures to just 0.73 -excluding Russian-built aircraft- and virtually all of those are 1960's and 1970's era jets.
But while the accident rate has plummeted the propensity to criminalise airline accidents has soared on the back of over-zealous prosecutors and government officials who are often covering up system shortcomings.
These prosecutors, many under Napoleonic law, where the pursuit of a guilty party is essential, take their lead from what Dekker terms the "old view" of accidents.
This view espouses human error as the cause of most accidents, putting forward the idea that the systems are safe. Further the "old view" says progress on safety can only be made by protecting these systems from unreliable humans through automation, training and punitive discipline.
However, the "new view" -and that of most in the airline industry- "sees human error not as a cause but as a symptom of failure", Dekker says. The problem is simple. If pilots and others fear they will be prosecuted, they will naturally withold information that will be critical to preventing the same accident from re-occurring.
The most high-profile criminal prosecution was that of
SabreTech's involvement in the
ValuJet DC-9-30 crash in the Florida Everglades on May 11, 1996 which killed 110 people.
A new benchmark in the aggressive pursuit of criminalisation was set in 1999 by Katherine Fernandez-Rundle, Dade County state attorney, when announcing a 220-count indictment against
SabreTech.
She claimed at the time that "hopefully the chilling reality of criminal charges -murder and manslaughter charges- will send a very clear message to the aviation industry that will save lives in the future."
The decision to bring criminal charges was made despite the fact that the National transportation Safety Board determined that the crash was caused by three major factors and four contributing factors, not all of them attributable to actions by
SabreTech.
Former NTSB chairman Jim Hall stated at the time: "The
ValuJet accident resulted from failures all up and down the line -from federal regulators to airline executives in the boardroom to workers on the shop-room floor."
The wash-up of the criminal investigation was that
SabreTech's employees were acquitted of all criminal charges and most of the charges against the company were dismissed, or overturned on appeal.
But the charges and media exposure forced
SabreTech, once the third-largest independent repair station, out of business, according to Kenneth Quinn, partner of Winthrop, Stimson, Putman & Roberts, counsel for the airline.
Giving evidence in 2000 before a US House of Representatives aviation subcommittee, Quinn also expressed deep concerns at the aggressive action of prosecutors citing raids on facilities, unlawful seizure of privileged documents, late-night doorstop interviews of employees by homicide detectives and charges of murder and manslaughter before interviews or discussion with counsel.
One final explanation for the drive for the criminalisation of aviation accidents is put by Dekker, who says: "Faced with a bad, surprising event, we seem more willing to change the players in the event (by destroying their reputations) than to amend our basic beliefs about the system that made the event possible."