The official response from he who would not recognise a principle if it bit him on the @rse:
"We're waiting to see if the **** hits the fan. If the media forget about this in a couple of days we'll just ignore the Jauncey Committee report."
Or, to be fair to the man, the official version from the No 10 Lobby Brief <a href="http://www.number10.gov.uk" target="_blank">http://www.number10.gov.uk</a> , see if you think it's any different from the succinct precis above!
. .LOBBY BRIEFING: 11AM TUESDAY 5 FEBRUARY 2002
CHINOOK REPORT
Asked if the Government would issue an official response to the House of Lords Committee report on the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre, the PMOS said that the MoD had only received the report within the last hour or so. They would make a more substantial response later this afternoon. We recognised that this was an issue which had attracted a huge amount of scrutiny and a significant number of inquiries in the past.
However, we were not aware that today's report provided any new evidence as to what might have happened. The Committee had reach their conclusions based on the evidence in front of them. Everyone understood that the detailed, technical, legal airmanship issues were very complex.
Obviously we would want to study the report in detail and give a full response to it. He drew journalists' attention to the MoD's original conclusions regarding the accident. The 'no doubt whatsoever', which was the standard of proof that the reviewing officers - namely Air Chief Marshal Sir John Day and Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratton - had reached, was obviously of a very high standard. In their professional judgement, that standard had been met.
The Board of Inquiry rules at the time had required, in the case of an accident attributed to negligence, a decision to be reached as to whether it had been the result of minor negligence, gross negligence or recklessness. An assessment had been made that this case was the result of gross negligence. It had been their duty to reach an honest verdict based on the evidence, which they had done. The Lords Committee report had been published today and we would look carefully at its conclusions.
Put to him that our agreement to look at this new report sounded as though it was just a formality and that we had already made up our minds about it, the PMOS disagreed. We had said we would study the report in detail and give a full response. Equally, it was important to set out exactly how the MoD had reached their own conclusions and on what basis, citing the high standard of proof reached by the two Air Chief Marshals.
Questioned about the 'no doubt whatsoever' conclusion that had been reached in the MoD's report, the PMOS said we accepted that the Lords report was a detailed piece of work which required scrutiny. We would consider the conclusions very carefully. However, he was simply making the point that in reaching the conclusions which the two reviewing officers had reached, they would obviously have had to make an assessment in their professional judgement as to whether the necessary standard of proof existed. In order to make that decision they would have had to be pretty confident that the proof was there.
Questioned as to whether we were taking the position we were taking because one of the Air Chief Marshals was now the head of Strike Command and that having his judgement questioned would obviously be very embarrassing for him, the PMOS said no. In reaching the decision the two had reached, it was clear they had made judgements according to their professional expertise, which was considerable. However, the fact that one of the Air Chief Marshals was head of Strike Command did not materially alter the judgement that had been reached. Asked whether more compensation would be payable to the families of the victims as a result of the report, the PMOS said not as far as he was aware."