I read a fascinating and thought-prooking article about the air war in Kosovo.
Entitled 'Douhet Is Not Enough', it was by one Wg Cdr Edward Stringer, who may or may not be one of the infamous Jaguar-flying Stringer brothers.
The intro begins:
"This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of one of the communication skills requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. .....
"The germ of an idea from which this essay sprang was that Allied air forces in Kosovo in 1999 could not achieve militarily what their ancestors had in Normandy in 1944. That is, the domination of the battlespace to the extent that enemy ground movement was virtually stalled. After much research this simple comparative idea mushroomed into a critique of current NATO air power employment. The essay examines the evolution of current USAF doctrine, which drives NATO doctrine, and concludes that it now over-concentrates on the strategic level of war. Procurement has followed doctrine, and Western air forces are now configured such that they are predisposed to fight strategic bombing campaigns. Unfortunately, strategic bombing is not usually effective when used in isolation. Nor is it always politically possible to wage an intense strategic campaign in a limited conflict short of general war. Western air forces should re-examine their doctrine to ensure that it allows them more options than strategic bombing."
It's at:
http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/papers/csc26.../stringer.html
If Kosovo's mistakes were that it was conducted at too slow a pace (giving too long for opposition and doubts to build and grow, and exacerbating refugee/relief problems), and that it ignored tactical targets (allowing the enemy to carry on their military operations), and that there was insufficient linkage between targets and objectives, are we not repeating those same mistakes in the current operation.
Two days ago, on what must have been the eighth day of the air war, I saw LANTIRN footage taken that day of the USN finally getting around to destroying Su-17s on the ground. Shouldn't these have 'gone up in smoke' on Day 1 or Day 2?
A Radio 4 journalist out there yesterday opined that the Air War so far has 'achieved virtually nothing' and hinting that the operation may be politically driven - conducted over a deliberately extended period to give the impression of doing something.
Why not commit larger forces to this campaign, and get this phase over more quickly, before coalition support crumbles? Could it be that by committing larger forces future defence cuts would be harder to justify? Two carriers? Ten B-52s? It's hardly Desert Storm, is it?
Am I alone in feeling slightly uncomfortable about this?