Responsibilities
Dick, et al,
These same people, that are quietly lobbying their perceived interest in cost savings without TCAS, are also the ones vociferously complaining about the traffic conflicts that are becoming a more regular event around the regional airports of Australia.
The RAAA and its member airlines have demonstrated their willingness to be out of step with the aviation environment in Australia, and for that matter the rest of the developed world, on the issue of TCAS. They appear to be motivated by issues of cost to their business operations. In my book, that’s profit before safety. Neither the regulator nor the rest of the Australian aviation community should accept such a position. We all have a safety responsibility within the aviation system and we don’t have the latitude to “cherry pick” the areas in which we are prepared to meet our responsibilities.
Providing and operating a TCAS system does come with a cost, as does operating a transponder, but it’s a small cost in comparison with the vast majority of other aircraft costs.
I recently purchased a small format transponder for fitment to my recreational aircraft. The difference in price to obtain Modes-S now was about AUD $1,300 over and above Modes-A, C. The unit is already ADS-B compliant and I’ve made a decision to go ahead with Modes-S now. The responsibility toward an improved safety outcome requires it.
Arguments against transponder fitment on the basis of costs and power requirements have been largely mitigated in the past five years. The available options have increased significantly in this period. What’s happened to TCAS cost over this same period?
Frankly, waiting for the ADS-B process to be finalised in Australia before addressing the Mode-S side or TCAS side (interim) of the equipment requirements means the waste of a considerable opportunity to improve the safety of operation in an environment that has amply demonstrated a growing potential for incident or worse. It’s going to be an interesting incident investigation when the regional airliner without TCAS meets the Mode-S equipped conflict; an incident or worse when there could have been a progressive deconflicted resoltion advisory for at least one party. That’s a compelling case for all parties that cannot be ignored.
The other side of the equation that must be upheld is the reporting of traffic conflict incidents. This data is continuously required now to decide which elements of the debate are fact and which elements are fiction.
Last edited by dragonflyhkg; 15th Oct 2007 at 05:53.