Except for those little mistakes, I also find the article quite good. You don't find much of this (about aviation) in this part of the globe. There are few details that portray the reality of the Gulf aviation reality such as:
1. It is noteworthy that the term “statedowned” has a different meaning the context of Gulf societies compared to the West because many assets are owned by the ruling families. This, in turn, means that “state-owned” companies there are more similar to Western-style family businesses than to Western-style state corporations.
2. Moreover, and again in clear contrast to Western practices, most of Dubai’s “stateowned” enterprises must operate in open, competitive markets on commercial terms. Their profits and dividend payments – instead of taxes – are also the main source of income in Dubai’s state budget.
3. Also, Qatar Airways currently operates a fleet of 57 aircraft with another 113 on firm order, and Etihad’s fleet comprises 25 widebodies (plus 21 aircraft on order). While Qatar Airways’ catch-up strategy with Emirates seems to rely largely on undercutting its competitor while offering similar product quality, Etihad’s expansion might prevent Emirates from obtaining much needed traffic rights to countries that do not pursue an open-skies policy (note that both Emirates and Etihad are UAE based carriers). What is more, both the Qatari and Abu Dhabi’s governments (i.e. ruling families) have devoted huge budgets to the expansion of their local airport facilities. By 2008, Doha’s airport will be able to handle 50 million passengers (compared to today’s 6llion), while Abu Dhabi’s airport will be upgraded to 40 million pax (9 million today) – in addition to a substantial expansion of cargo facilities. It remains to be seen whether this unprecedented buildup of capacity by two (still) unprofitable regional competitors (and their government owners) will have a negative impact on Emirates in the long-run.