Lemurian wrote:
In fact I have THE solution that will satisfy everybody : Cancel the *Retard* call-out altogether, just like Boeing has never done. May be the pilots will become more intelligent and not rely on a synthetic voice to cue them on a primary flying school basic, simple action.
In fact, that'it, isn't it?
PBL wrote:
You will find that in any accident there are lots of factors that satisfy your criterion, not just one, so your explanation is ill-defined. If you want to call them all "primary causes", I guess that's fine. The rest of us call them causes.
Of course I'm oversimplifying. Accident investigation is complex, and I espect, when I read a report, that it includes a thourough analisys that will find the lessons to be learned to everyone.
But I see this discussion revolving around the *warning* subject, which to me has very little to do with the *lessons to be learned* in this accident. It's probbably very contrary to what should be learned. Many pilots here think of the RETARD autocallout as superfluous, because it reminds us of something that's a basic action of landing an a/c.
If in fact, it happened that they left one throttle behind, probbably one of the lessons will be that basic airmanship is beeing overlooked, and I believe there are some aspects of FBW Airbus control systems that need to be re-thinked, not actually the warning systems.
But if they had closed both throttles, would we be here discussing this?
How's that for a primary cause, PBL, you tell me?
If you look at Los Rodeos, one of the most startling chain of events ever presented, what if it dind't start the takeoff roll without clearence? Would it have happened? I don't think so. I'm not throwing blame on him, nothing like that. But why do I draw attention to the takeoff clearence? Because it's the most basic failure, and I call it the spark. Where's the relevance of this to aviation? I think the most basic aspects are were the pilot has the greatest chances of breaking the accident chain, so their importance must allways be stressed. Complex situations may not easily be counteracted by crews, so basic airmanship is still a good resource.
Lemurian wrote:
The thoroughness of that flight preparation could be also questioned : 31 minutes from WonW to WoffW, minus taxi times, minus deplaning and boarding times, minus walk-around, minus the dealing times with all intervenants... on blue weather could be done...but for a flight onto a dicey runway with adverse weather and an inop T/R, I seriously doubt the quality of such preflight.
I wonder if the Managment of TAM (and many other airlines) has any ideia what you're talking about. Captain authorithy is nowadays nothing but a distant myth, in many places.
Lemurian wrote:
When the decision was made to land at CGH, The crew QRH page on LDR should have raised a few alarms : At their planned landing weight (info available on the Fuel page of the MCDU), they would have needed 1840m -had they considered *wet*, or discovered that they were outside the LDA had they considered *3 to 6 mmm of standing water*. (LDR = 2130 m at sea level, so no need to go any further). To stress this point further, an LDA of 1880 m is respected at weights under 50 tons, putting them some 13 tons over the *accepted* limit. (source : QRH, Full flaps-no reverse-no autobrake).
Lots of automation, but not enough, uh? Not in the FMS, not in our concerns?