Stopping distances as calculated in the operations manual do not take into account reverser deployment.
- they do in the Boeing QRP for the NG. I do not know what Ops Manual figures SW use.
Loke - looking at the NTSB Pdf files, it appears this crew 'expected improved stopping using reversers' which does indicate a training (or even Ops Manual) issue since the Boeing figures I use assume use of No 2 detent, but it also states that 'other crews are aware' of this need. The NTSB safety recs are interesting in particular 4) and 5) as you point out
4) Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety margin of 15 percent.
5) Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, part 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” and “Urgent.” Supercedes Safety Recommendation A-06-16.)
My bold - and no mention of visibilty
A-06-16 (Previously issued)
Immediately prohibit all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators from using reverse thrust credit in landing performance calculations. (A-06-16)
This recommendation (previously classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” on May 8, 2007) is classified “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superceded” by Safety Recommendation [5] in section 2.3 of this report.