To avoid further 'hot-under-the-collar' responses I will leave a/c manufacturer and type out of this post.
Now, there will no doubt be an outcry from our investigation and systems experts but to me it boils down to this:
One JOINT primary cause of the accident - a higher than idle thrust on No 2 engine, preventing ground spoiler deployment by the crew. (Note: I have no doubt the 'most likely cause', for many reasons, will be crew error for the power setting, but I do not think it will be actually determineable). It is also by no means certain that if the g/spoilers had been deployed OR the thrust reduced at some point there would not have been a bad accident, of course, due to the airfield terrain.
A host of secondary causes which have been well discussed.
So, we have to move forward. Those involved in training know what they have to do. Tyro and others eagerly await the 'Oriental' friend of marciovp giving us the way to simulate a SYSTEM failure in the simulator which might cause this power setting. In the meantime ALL pilots will hopefully have re-learned that all throttles should be closed on landing, and stay closed unless power is needed.
I suggest there should be a 'fail-safe' way to deploy ground spoilers as a 'must' in all a/c, be it a switch, lever or button, or some carefully designed logic function. Specific re-inforcement training needs to be given on this too. Could someone answer my question in Post #2541 please?
Particular aspects of a/c performance and procedures with and without T/R and specific airfield restrictions will no doubt be looked at.
I agree fully with PK-KAR's post - but note that there the high power setting is specifically blamed on the crew.