PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil
View Single Post
Old 29th Sep 2007, 01:06
  #2526 (permalink)  
RWA
 
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Melbourne
Posts: 180
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by PBL
I was reconstructing what I take to be AI's position from the comments that Malinge made. It is a coherent reconstruction (as it has to be; I couldn't imagine AI or any other airframe manufacturer presenting dumb arguments on such an important issue).
Oops, sorry to jump down your throat then - guess we'll all have consider making more use of sub-headings etc. - in that spirit:-

Recommended Strategy for Airbus (if the case goes to court):-

1. Putting too much emphasis on the logical process of decision is inadvisable - it invites accusations of mistake (actually taking a wrong decision, i.e. DECIDING not to install any extra warning) as opposed to mere negligence (i.e failing to decide in good time on the best FORM of any such warning, even though development work etc. had been completed on the one eventually used).

2. Therefore the preferred posture should be to admit to treating the issue as less than 'top urgent,' for the reason that no serious accidents had occurred as a result of the problem, nor did any appear likely to happen.

3. This should be coupled with pressure on the airline to show what extra training on TL handling it put in place after the earlier incidents; and on the airport authority to indicate what runway modifications etc. it commissioned to allow for any such overruns. The answers in both cases are likely to be 'Sorry, none.'

That's all on the basis of what I know so far, though. If I actually WAS back in my working days, and involved in helping to prepare Airbus' case, there's some questions I'd need answers to before finalising any recommendation (or, indeed, before getting involved at all). These are:-

Additional Questions for Airbus:-

1. At some time between the Taipei incident and the Congonhas accident you apparently recommended changes to A320 throttle-handling procedure in the event of one reverser inop. - specifically, that both handles should be pulled back not just to 'idle,' but beyond 'idle' into full reverse.

2. Did the decision to recommend this new procedure have anything to do with your findings following previous overrun incidents like Taipei? If so, WHAT were your findings, WHEN did you obtain them, WHO did you tell, and WHY did they prompt the change to 'both levers to full reverse'?

If, there does turn out to be some connection (in the form of a software or hardware glitch which hasn't yet been disclosed) that would very much change the picture.

Last edited by RWA; 29th Sep 2007 at 01:49.
RWA is offline