The crew of the previous flight (BH-CGH) was not the same. The PF worked during the previous years for Transbrasil and Passaredo, fliying on Boeing 737, and, if he really did a mistake, it is possible that this fact could in some way have contributed to it. But, in any case, it should be stressed that TAM's pilots did follow different procedures for the same kind of situation.
Confirm that the accident happened on the FIRST OR SECOND landing of the day for the crew? (And not 3rd or any higher number?)
If so, one must ask the previous crew landing in CGH, if they did retard both to idle and then reverse because the FDR did not read it as such, BUT did so in Porto Alegre. If the answer comes out as:
1. "Yes I brought both levers to idle and then reverse", Airbus has some answering to do...
2. "No, I brought both to reverse then #1 only into reverse," then TAM has some answering to do...
If not, then, the PF for both landings CGH is the same?
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*RETARD ENGINE ONE *-or TWO- after the identification of one missing T/L in the *Idle* detent, along with a warning and caution chime.
Why not if both engines are on, weight on wheels, >72kts IRS speed, FLAPS 3(orFULL) and 1 is moved into reverse and the other is still in CLB, then "WARNING THRUST DISAGREE" on the voice... *just another lame PK-KAR idea*
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I dare say that was a pretty busy cockpit.
Re-cycle as in moving the speedbrake lever?
It was busy... if I remember correctly it took them 7 seconds to notice something was wrong, and 11th second the braking started. If it happened with them, it could take us 7 seconds or more too! That's scary.
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In the video that shows the last stages of the landing run, there is what it seems to be an explosion in the #2 eng area, seems like a compressor stall, but could be anything else. For the little I've looked at the FDR graphs, there is no evidence of that event. I will take some time to back track from the moment of the final impact to try to plot that instant on the graphs. But is there any theory around this event?
The exact location on where this happened is one of extreme curiousity for me, but after looking at the photos of the "excursion area" and the FDR, there's little to go on except some longitudinal accelerations did happen near the flash... While the lateral shows the airplane was skidding.
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This is why I think it's always necessary to check for spoiler deployment before applying reversers... I think the crew deserves a go-around chance if no spoilers are deployed... But then, ask Airbus not me...
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PK-KAR