bsieker
great update you gave me here, it'll take me some time to digest it. And also great job on the WBG. As you said, I haven't and won't read this thread from the begining, so this will help me a lot.
We will have to wait for the final report to have reliable answers, and I know that the wreckage examination will help to sort this either way (crew error and/or mechanical failure). I'm not standing up for any theory, merely reminding ourselves that several hipothesys are surely being raised by the investigators. I think this case is beeing so thoroughly discussed before the investigation conclusions, precisely because people are afraid of a technical failure, one that could take some more lives before the TAM final report (I'm not implying that it exists).
Just one more question, to know if you have an opinion:
In the video that shows the last stages of the landing run, there is what it seems to be an explosion in the #2 eng area, seems like a compressor stall, but could be anything else. For the little I've looked at the FDR graphs, there is no evidence of that event. I will take some time to back track from the moment of the final impact to try to plot that instant on the graphs. But is there any theory around this event?
Lemurian
Trying to answer your questions:
Were all the FMA changes, and generally all the messages (be they caution or change of configuration...) announced by the crew, and by whom ? YES, BY PNF, IN THE CASE CM2, THE INSTRUCTOR
Did they seem to have *triggers* for check-lists (like QNH = xxxx triggers the call for *Approach check*...) ? YES
Did the handling pilot call for specific speed values or just *Speed S...Speed F+20...etc... or did he make his own speed setting ? SPECIFIC VALUES, AS I CAN RECALL IT
Was the A/THR used during the approach or was it manual thrust ? I THINK IT WAS ON, I'M NOT SURE
Was the autobrake used ? YES
If yes, was *Decel* called out, along with *Spoilers deployed*,* Reverse green*...? YES, *DECEL* I DON'T REALY REMEMBER
I'm in the A310, but I've observed that the SOPīs and standard callouts are very much alike in the FBW generation. Although I probably was sometimes distracted with conversation with a coleague in the other jump seat, and thus cannot guarantee a 100% compliance, the overall impression was of compliance with SOP's. If there's one positive thing about the Airbus philosophy, is that it gives all the tools necessary to have a disciplined flight deck, so that's probably why the Airbus fleet is more strict than other fleets.