alf5071h
With further speculation, Airbus may have concluded that as the recommendation was only ‘to review’, and that the primary finding in the accident report related to training and crew co-operation, then a training solution (procedural) had greater relevance. Hence the change to the MEL DDG procedure requiring both TLs to be selected to reverse.
I am not sure that the procedure change was related to the TransAsia accident.After some research I did on this subject, it seems that it came from a query from some airlines operating types from both manufacturers as a way to have common procedures...It became an Airbus SOP later, probably after some extensive study on risks. However, the original procedure had to do with an *Inop T/R*, not a *De-activated T/R*.
The procedural solution might be seen as having advantages of not changing normal operations, and (as I understand the system), provide an additional awareness / error check during MEL ops; i.e. both TL in REV results in 2 annunciations (amber/green).
I understand your point, and I agree with you, on the proviso that with a locked-out T/R, there won't be an
amber *Reverse* annunciation, as it is related to the sleeves being in transit. As the said sleeves are physically prevented from moving, one would have then a blank on the engine ECAM. And your ECAM aspect would then be *GREEN/Blank*.