Originally Posted by alf5071h
Thus, (with positive speculation), if Airbus considered alternative means of alerting and discussed these as options with the Taiwanese, they could have been reported as either proposals for action (planned action) or just considerations for other methods for remedial action; I doubt that we can fully understand this or anything else which could have been be lost in translation.
alf, it's well worth downloading and reading the whole Report - it's admirably clear, well set out, and appears to have been well-translated: which reduces the scope for speculation.
The actual Safety Recommendation reads:-
"1. Reviewing the design of stop mode of Retard warning sounds or accommodating other warning methods to ensure that the warning will continue before the thrust levers are pulled back to Idle notch after a touchdown has affirmed.ASC-ASR-06-03 –006"
The operative word in that, to my mind, is
'ensure'. Back in 2004 the Taiwan Board appears to have identified the key problem, spelled out the probability that it might happen again, and recommended action that would have gone a long way towards preventing a recurrence. To quote the body of the Report:-
"In this situation, one of thrust control lever is not in proper position but the aural "RETARD” alert already stopped. The aural “RETARD” alert should continue or there should be other ways to remind the pilots of pulling back thrust control lever to reduce the probability of an accident caused by human error."
If Airbus later found that the new warning that they themselves had proposed couldn't be made to work, or was inadvisable, or whatever, they should have so informed the safety authorities; and gone on trying to devise one. There is no evidence so far that they did that.
Originally Posted by alf5071h
With further speculation, Airbus may have concluded that as the recommendation was only ‘to review’, and that the primary finding in the accident report related to training and crew co-operation, then a training solution (procedural) had greater relevance. Hence the change to the MEL DDG procedure requiring both TLs to be selected to reverse.
As explained above, their duty was to
'ensure,' not just
'review.' And I for one can't see how the 'both levers to full reverse' thing is relevant. If, as pointed out by the Taiwanese and other investigating boards, it was possible for highly-experienced pilots to neglect the need to bring both levers back to 'idle,' what would be the point in telling them to adopt an even more complex (and counter-intuitive) procedure?
Surely they'd have been just as likely to 'neglect' that too? As far as I'm concerned, on the available information, a continued warning would have been a much better solution?