One of the main issues for me is that none of the experts who study and devise strategies for such "decision problems under uncertainty" would go so far as to make a strategy compulsory. But that is what the BFU recommended about TCAS RAs, and that is what other organisations are promoting.
But do their "decision problems under uncertainty" include a
very limited amount of time for assessment and action? It's a bit like the "rules of engagement" that military personnel operate under - if they're made too complicated, people on both sides end up being killed unnecessarily.
There are finite probabilities that normal actions taken on board aircraft may have diverse undesired catastrophic results, through system failure/design/build or just plain bad luck. These probabilities are low enough for the failure modes to be discarded by the operator as unlikely and confusing and are not included in SOPs for this reason. This is how I view a TCAS RA. Yes, there may be a small chance that the software has failed to provide an adequate solution to a complicated multi-body problem - but what do I do about that, especially as I know that incorrect action (or inaction) will lead to a "sub-optimal safety scenario" 99.99% of the time?
IMHO the authorities have it right this time. Bluntly, either you do what it says or you might as well not fit it. To be effective, TCAS relies on at least one interested party doing something close to what it is suggesting; to inject an element of doubt at this stage does not help matters much and may lead to a reduction in the chances of a successful conflict resolution.