For the last time - real-time systems such as those used in the A32/3/4/80 are a completely different paradigm and methodology to the imperatively programmed systems that the average person thinks about when discussing computers
Everything ends up in imperative code: MOV, PUSH, POP, etc. Processors don't work in the functional mode.
Higher Level has to go to Low Level and there is where s... might happen (I said might).
For the last time, too: Investigators should be open
to all possibilities. We have
to know the system, how it synchronizes, how it takes input, how it process input, how it takes priorities and so on. Not just make general and pseudo-authoritative statements about it.
However I have a clear disavantadge to defend my point here, as our dear CENIPA says it found the TL pedestal but does not show any photograph or any impression about it. And then sends the piece to the potential "wolf"...
By the way I will ask again: Where are the docs about that (one) TL above idle warning ?
(P.S. : The information about the TL pedestal is confirmed news - from the last day of air traffic parlamentary commission)
Aerospace pays a lot of attention to safety analysis and user-interface engineering, and has an international system (or collection of systems) for logging and learning from incidents (the all-operators Telex/Service Bulletin/AD system).
I think human beings are the same whatever the industry they are engaged into.
Take that (again !!) TL above idle warning and what AI safety director stated about it before Congressmen.
BTW, my guesses:
1 - He was saying the truth (yet to confirm);
2 - The warning could work more frequently than "desirable", showing some problem with TLA sensors (maybe someone understands me here);
3 - The warning related procedure represented a risky overload to the A320 realtime computer system given the available processing capacity.