The case was heard in the High Court in July. It lasted three weeks, there was a great deal of technical and expert evidence called by all parties. Judgment was given in October.
I should declare an interest - I represented BF Goodrich.
Knight Air claimed that the Bandeirante crashed because of the failure of one or both the artificial horizons shortly after departure.
The aircraft entered a spiral dive from 3000' only four minutes after takeoff.
KnightAir claimed that the crash was caused by the failure of the artificial horizons - as a result of the negligence of the three defendants.
It was clear on the evidence that at least one horizon suffered a 'soft' failure. ie It gave inaccurate readings, but did not fail completely - no flag warning.
KnightAir claimed that both must have suffered 'soft' failures although conceding that, statistically, the chances of both failing in a four minute period was extremely remote.
All the evidence pointed to the Captain being the handling pilot - the FO operated the radio throughout.
KnightAir sued (1) Embraer, (2) BF Goodrich Avionics Systems which now owns the company which manufactured the instruments, and (3)CSE who maintained the instruments.
(The case against CSE was abandoned during the first days of the trial when the Judge refused Knight Air's application to change the entire basis of the case against CSE at the last moment.)
In very brief summary, KnightAir's case was:
(1) against Embraer
that the AH's installed by Embraer were unsuitable for use in commuter aircraft;
that Embraer became aware that they were unsafe and failed to warn operators.
(2) against BF Goodrich
that the CMM was inadequate in that it failed to specify precisely what work should be carried out when the AH's were repaired/serviced;
that Goodrich knew their recommended maintenance procedures resulted in horizons being unreliable and unsafe, but did nothing to rectify the problem.
Both companies denied negligence and further alleged that, even in the extremely unlikely event of both horizons failing, the crew should have been able to fly the aircraft safely on the remaining instruments all of which were functioning normally.
KnightAir's case depended heavily on the exceptionally low MTBF noted by the AAIB which, if accurate, would arguably have meant the horizons were unsafe. However, we discovered an error in the data used by the AAIB. The true MTBF was significantly higher. KnightAir's own expert agreed that, on the basis of the true figure, the horizons could not be said to be unsafe.
Although KnightAir alleged that the CMM was inadequate, examination of other manufacturers' CMMs revealed that it was consistent with the industry standard for this basic type of horizon.
Further, KnightAir seemed to have overlooked the significance of artificial horizons being 'on condition' items and, for that reason, are likely to fail in service. The CAA in common with all (or virtually all) aviation authorities in the world treat artificial horizons as 'on condition' instruments. Although it is accepted that an AH failure will significnatly increase workload, it is assumed that a pilot will be able to fly safely on the remaining instruments.
The Judge concluded that KnightAir were unable to substantiate even one of the many allegations of negligence made against either Embraer or Goodrich.
Both claims were dismissed.
KnightAir was ordered to pay the legal costs of all three defendant companies.
In the circumstances, it was not strictly necessary for the Judge to decide whether the crew's handling of the situation contributed to or caused the crash.
However, for good legal reasons which I needn't go into, it is normal practice to do so.
The question in law is whether their actions fell below the standard to be expected of a competent flight crew.
The Judge said that,
if it had been necessary for him to decide the point, he was sadly driven to the conclusion that they fell below that standard on this occasion. He noted that both the CAA and the AAIB, together with all expert pilot witnesses except one, told the court that professional pilots with I/Rs should be able to fly safely by partial panel on the remaining remaining instruments. (The one exception agreed if it was a single failure, but not a double failure.)
One expert witness called by KnightAir (a retired CAA I/R examiner at Leeds/Bradford) said it was legitimate practice to continue to use a failed horizon making allowances for the failoure, and to 'interpolate' from it.
His view was not shared by any of the other expert witnesses (on either side) who considered his idea to be bad practice and potentially very dangerous; although it is difficult to do so, a horizon known to be giving inaccurate readings should be ignored completely.
NB:
The case did NOT affect the financial position of the families of the crew and pasengers whose claims had been already been settled.
KnightAir blamed the demise of the company on the crash, and hoped to recover damages from the defendants. Their insurers hoped to recover from the defendants the sums already paid out.
Sadly, what it did mean was that it then became necessary to examine in detail the crew's actions - which would have been better not reopened. That's just a personal view as a pilot.
HugMonster
The judge was clearly reluctant to blame the pilots, but (as I read it) found there was sufficient doubt about their performance to prevent the claim from succeeding.
Your understanding is not correct.