@FullWings:
You base your descision, which reaction to a collision threat is good, which is bad on the manual and the outcome of a situation.
As the outcome of a collision threat and the actions to resolve it can only be judged after the threat is resolved (or not), a crew cannot use this criteria for its descisions. Leaving only the manuals. If all manuals around the world contain the same instructions, all would be fine. But in the Ueberlingen accident, this was not the case.
Finally, it's because the manual says: "
NEVER MANOUVER AGAINST AN RA".
The Tu154M Flight Operations Manual had the following passgae (at least around Jul 2002) and, as you will note, "never manouver against an RA" was not in it.
"For the avoidance of in-flight collisions is the visual control of the siituation in the airspace by the crew and the
correct execution of all instructions by ATC to be viewed as the most important tool.
TCAS is an
additional instrument which ensures the timely determination of on-coming traffic. the classification of the risk and, if necessary, planning of an advice for a vertical avoidancy manoeuvre."
So the "never manoeuver against an RA" at least was not in the TU154M FOM. Instead the crew was supposed to follow ATC, get visual control of the situation and descide for itself, which action best to take.
So, if the out-come and the manuals are not usable for deciding on good and bad reaction to a collision threat, what criteria do we have left?