A significant argument for keeping this thread open is to enable others to gain an insight to the range of views, attitudes, beliefs (mis-beliefs), and biases expressed by the contributors.
Based on some responses from claimed pilots or professionals, any regulatory authority would have to be concerned about the apparent low levels of technical knowledge, not only for specific aircraft types but aviation safety in general. Also, the range attitudes, communication style, analysis, and ideas could be dismaying for the CRM community, where training to improve these issues is a cornerstone of safety.
Alternatively it is rewarding to find a high level of informed debate and expertise from which we can learn, and develop and improve our safety defences, either as individuals or organisations. I much prefer to say ‘I didn’t know that’; then privately seek the evidence on which to base my judgement and future belief (subject to my understanding of the situation).
For those who wish to close the discussion or leave the thread, their wishes might reflect a false belief or bias. Is their request an indication of ‘it couldn’t happen to me’, because ‘I’ have made my mind up – failing to consider all of the information, explore all options, including learning from other’s misfortune.
Often accident reports have similar shortcomings and may not fully consider the practical aspects of implementing safety defences. Formal reports are written for authorities or governments and may be restrained from meaningful speculation and debate. This thread sets a new standard in these areas; one which the formal-reporting processes should take note of. There may be more to be learnt about the state of safety in our industry and the need for practical safety defences from the content of this thread than will ever be published in a final report; but then I should not prejudge that, wait and see.
For the unconvinced lurkers, remember that many of the human factor contributions in this accident appear to originated from the central L Liveware (human) in the SHELL model, and may have involved poor knowledge, mis-belief, bias, and problematic communication.
Also, any external contribution to the accident from the surrounding SHEL elements will interface with the central Liveware. The recent themed discussions of ‘cause’, being either human (L) or aircraft (H), might benefit from balancing these views with other eternal elements such as software (procedures, rules, etc), other people (management and NFP) and the environment (organisations as well as the weather/runway). Finally, remember that all of the arms of the SHELL model are formed from an external element (the situation) and the central human, and an interface between them, which in many systems is the weakest point.
Can the ‘Why–Because’ group map their thoughts to SHELL?