marciovp'
1. Why the plane was loaded with more fuel than needed?
2. Why the plane was carrying more people than it was certified for? (It was certified for 162 seats and had 174 seats).
3. Why did this plane landed with a locked out reverser in a short, wet, slippery runaway?
4. Why didnīt AB make it mandatory for all A320s to have the new software that keep advising the pilots of one TL not being in Idle or Rev.
5. Why this particular plane has had now three similar accidents by six pilots making the same mistakes?
6. Why ANAC made a rule that planes should not land in Congonhas with one reverser locked out and then withdrew it?...
7. Why Congonhas runway was liberated in a rainy day without grooving?
And so on.
Some of these questions have been answered before on this very thread :
1. They were tankering, apparently in order either to save on fuel costs because jet a is more expensive at CGH or saving on turn-around time, or both. Normal practice on all airlines. Whether it was reasonable or not is not for me to say. What I know is that performance-wise, there were no objections.
2. Careful, here. According to FAR 25.807, the seating capacity for such an aircraft, equipped with 4 Type I and 4 Type III exits is 179 seats, crew members excluded. Therefore, the number of seats was correct for the configuration.
3. You pose a question on TAM procedures and policy that I'm not in a position to discuss. Once again, they had the performance to land on a
wet runway such as CGH 31. On the other hand, was the *slipperiness* taken into account ? In all probability, no but a definition of slippery in terms of friction. braking action...seems to be lacking on that airline FCOM.
If you are interested, you could have a very careful look at this BAC powerpoint presentation on
Landing on slippery runways
4.Airbus Industrie -AI- has absolutely no control on mandatory procedures. The certifying authorities do, and that will be the local DGCA services or their equivalent. What I know is that the implementation of this new warning was not well received by a great number of customers' technical services as inducing even more confusion than the old software. They went instead into more training on similar situations.
5.That's also a training question or a question of training. Depends how one looks at it. To concentrate on a perceived aircraft system fault amounts to putting the blame for a flat note on the piano instead of the pianist. I have shown, along with Christiaanj that very comparable events happened on 747s without anyone yelling for a change on its throttle system. Can't have it both ways.
6. and
7. Both belong to Brazilian politics that I am not ready to discuss. Let the politicians deal with them after the report has been published.
Another question you could have asked - based on the FDR - is about the preflight preparation for a landing at CGH. As the previously recorded times of landing and takeoff from the previous station are just about 31 minutes apart,
including taxying in and out, was all consideration due to the
reported poor braking taken into account ?
Or -second question- what destination was on the flight plan. Was it really CGH ? Was it GRU (as the initial conversation with the flight attendant suggests ) ? The implications are not equivalent, are they ?
Technical sources, please. With actual experiments preferably.
PBL is referring to the deceleration achieved by this aircraft taken from the FDR print-out. A very *poor* braking indeed.
Regards.
Lemurian