Just for argument's sake - and from a completely unrelated forum.....
"A fascinating story. Much enjoyed! So let's stir the pot with a little controversy.....
a) The bit about no-one realising that flying in close formation, with the necessary constant throttle adjustments, would result in fuel burn much increased over the info in the Operating Data Manual, is simply not credible.
This simply does not ring true. All aircrew know that constant throttle adjustment results in increased fuel use - and we all know this from driving cars! Besides, the Vulcan crews were 'operational' at low-level penetration - had been for years - and constant throttle adjustment to maintain crucial 'Time Over Target' was the norm. Monitoring fuel burn, and its variations, was and is a critical aspect of flight ops everywhere. This smacks of an order from on high to 'never mind the facts, my mind is made up'....
b) The crew's concerns about the 'Roland' SAM installation are valid. Faulty staff work indicated, firstly, that it was impossible for such a system to be transported to The Falklands. Some 'source' ( probably reconnaissance units on the ground ) spotted it and reported back. Consternation! Reading between the lines further on, suddenly the Vulcan crews weren't much worried after all. Could it possibly be that the SAM installation was 'taken out' by the same Special Forces team that had reported it? If so, they probably didn't last long afterwards....
c) The idea of an aircraft commander simply deciding for himself - without reference to the many layers of 'AirShips' directing every aspect of the operation - that he'd just pop up another couple of thousand feet to do the final Bomb Run, and that it wouldn't matter at all - is ludicrous. Every Target Planner in the English-speaking world would have sweated the midnight hours in determining what altitude was best - and why - and all that would have been fully agreed in advance. This bit smacks of another 'intel' cockup over the effective range of the installed AAA - a common issue that pervades the Service even today.
c) It is telling that the use of a handful of Vulcans to breach the runway at Stanley demonstrated something very significant to the Argie command structure, as did the effective use of submarine capability..... That Britain had retained the capability to mount offensive air operations many ( undetermined ) thousands of miles from a safe base, by means of that great 'force multiplier', in-flight refuelling.
This had been demonstrated frequently....
Quote:
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In 1975 ......the Guatemalans began concentrating their troops along the border once again. The British reaction was swift ......six Harrier GR.Mk1A "jump jets“ .....were deployed in a trans-Atlantic flight, supported by Handley Page Victor K.Mk.1A tankers,
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It was also known that, just a few years earlier, RAF Buccaneers with in-flight refuelling support had made a demonstration mock attack on a Soviet 'Kiev'-class carrier/cruiser in the Barents Sea near Novya Zemlya, thousands of miles beyond what the Soviets thought were the limits of that aircraft's effective Radius of Action. That exercise gave a sobering 'heads up' to military analysts and planners worldwide.
Perhaps the critical point about Operation Black Buck was the clear demonstration that British Air Power could be extended over the Argentinian mainland assets - using Vulcans and/or Buccaneers - should that be deemed necessary.
d) Comment is made in the book that sufficient navigational accuracy could not be guaranteed, and that this had implications for the conduct of operations. Bluntly, this is not so, and is likely to have been inserted to mask something else. All operational V-bomber crews were trained to navigate by astro to a very high degree of accuracy and reliability ( no GPS then ) - as were the corresponding B-52 SAC crews. Results of NATO Bombing Competitions over many years show clearly the standards reached - and the BLACK BUCK crews were the best available. Even student RAF navigators, regardless of their future postings, were all trained in precision astro-navigation techniques, without which demonstrated abilities they simply failed the Advanced Navigation Course. Then there was the Vulcan OCU......"
Food for thought - and argument?
