If there would have been a failure in the TL, its associated system, in the EEC, the FADEC, the trust revers system or any other relevant system, the pilots would have reacted differently. In case their intention was to stop (as they were) and a TL failure occurs, they would cut a trusting engine, i.e. put Master Switch 2 to off.
In case of a
detected problem with the thrust levers, the engine would have been put to idle anyway, if on the ground or if in flight with slats extended, and if not during take-off/go-around (iirc FLEX or TOGA will be maintained in case of TL fault, since these settings are only used if very high thrust is crucial ...)
I'm not arguing that I believe there was an undetected fault, I also think that possibility is very remote, but my intention with making my analysis public is to have a common ground, which all can agree to, and go on from there, without having to explain everything over again.
These two aspects lead most of us to believe that we can falsify the other reasons just brought up again by our Brazilian friends and the Brazilian Parliament committee.
I mostly agree with you, but falsify is too strong a word, that would require positive evidence, that nothing was wrong mechanically, which we do not have yet.
Can we finally agree with that and come back to a more needed discussion about what to do to avoid further accidents like these?
It may be a good starting point if we could agree to the Why-Because-Graph, or if someone does not agree, modify it such that all interested parties agree that this is what we know, and other aspects are some of the most likely hypotheses.
I hope that this will give a clear overview, and eliminate a lot of questions and repetitive back-and forth on this thread.
Bernd