bsieker,
There are a few points that seem to be absent in the graph :
- Between 11 and 12, there is no *No Decel* call out, whether it is in the SOPs or not, that call, in the airlines where it is SOP is a trigger for manual brake application,
- Looking at the rudder displacement print-out, it appears that there was some rather drastic application of rudder pedal, hence the assumption that, combined with 26 -*persistent significant forward thrust*- and 28 -*lower friction coefficient* -, there was some directional control difficulties which would have participated in 25 -*lower than expected wheel brake deceleration*-, or even 20 -*wheel brake application is delayed*-.
- I think that the "flatness" of the captain's 'stick inputs cannot be discarded, especially when we observe that quite early the F/O flight controls seem to be very active and that he is the one going aggressively with the braking.There is, from the FDR a glaring takeover by the F/O.
(I'm going to hate myself for this but it looks as if F/C suffered some incapacitation of some sort , whether mental -approach / landing /weather stress combined with a rapidly deteriorating situation -, psychological - bowing to the F/O' apparently strong personality - or plain physical ).
Sorry, I'd have preffered someone to pick on my earlier hints but nobody seemed interested.
Need to rest now.
Regards.