Not sure how many PPRuNers read the Indy - but Mary Dejevsky has an excellent article in todays comment section.
http://comment.independent.co.uk/columnists_a_l/mary.dejevsky/article2924406.ece
some extracts:
With US and British troops still in the field, the blame game transatlantic or domestic is as yet something the top brass can play only by proxy, through their allies in retirement. But there can be no doubt that it is being played and played by individuals of very great seniority and influence.
General Keane has served since his retirement as the eyes and ears of the US political establishment in Iraq. General Jackson became Britain's chief of general staff on the eve of the Iraq war, and has been increasingly open about his misgivings in retirement. Maj-Gen Cross was in charge of post-invasion planning on the British side.
........Listen to Maj-Gen Cross. "Right from the beginning," he says, "we were all very concerned about the lack of detail that had gone into the post-war plan."
I am sure they were. The many leaks to journalists from unhappy members of the defence and diplomatic establishment over those months testify eloquently to these worries. But if there was so much concern at the time from the British head of military planning, from Britain's newly appointed chief of the general staff, among others why in heaven's name were they not more open about it? Why did not any which one of them dare one mention the word resign?
.....Here we had some of the most senior officials in and around the Blair government, and now they "all" want us to know that they harboured enormous misgivings, but only about "post-war planning". So why, individually and collectively, were they so reticent when it mattered?
The arguments against resignation are well rehearsed. The non-resigner argues that his representations will be more effective if kept within the organisation. He speaks of a duty of loyalty or confidentiality. He insists that war is no time for resignations that could depress morale and so jeopardise the mission. He argues that the departure of someone so senior would not halt the doomed enterprise and could make matters worse by removing key expertise. Some admit that they just hoped Blair was right and they were wrong.
Just imagine, though, if the chief of general staff, chief of military operations planning, chief Downing Street foreign policy adviser and Britain's chief representative in Baghdad had relinquished their posts, citing their personal and professional "concerns"? Would British forces, I wonder, have had to steal away from Basra Palace in the small hours of the morning four years on?
airsound