Non-pilot speaking, with the proviso that I have read every single post in this thread (No, I do not have too much spare time but I find this a fascinating thread and so am giving the time to it).
Rananim
This plane didn't crash because the pilot forgot to retard the TL. It crashed because the plane's designers trapped the pilot halfway between a landing and an abort.
As far as I know, the official report on this accident has not yet been published ... ??? So I proceed with due caution.
When a person is instructed how to operate a machine, they are trained in the operation of that machine in such a way as to gain the maximum from it and to minimise the risk from it. This will include instructions from the manufacturer and the owner of the machine. From a basic (but still lethal) turning lathe to a cruise ship.
On taking delivery of a new cruise ship, the captain will be told the operating parameters of that ship. This will involve numerous mechanical and human factors upon which the safe operation is based, following exhaustive trials. If the Captain fails to operate the ship within those parameters - then they will be liable to a reprimand of some form (large or small). The unique factor for an airline captain is that failure is more likely to have catastrophic effects before any reprimand can be given.
This point has been gone over many times in this fascinating thread: if the pilots are shown to have operated outside the parameters of the machine and their instructions - whose fault was it?
We all wish to see faults reduced and, overall, the airline industry has a fabulous record, so everyone WANTS to find the right answer. If the right answer is that (it is reported here) four crews have failed at a critical moment in the understanding of their machine, then the authorities may decide
that is more important than the hundreds of thousands of times that the machine was operated correctly.
But
if they change the operating parameters for the 'benefit' of four crews - how will that change the situation for thousands of crews that already operate the machine every day, within it's correct parameters? Will you make their life more difficult and, consequently, open up risks as yet unquantified? Whenever you change one item in a system, you affect every other item to a greater or lesser, direct or indirect degree. [For the purpose of discussion 'operating parameters' would include all human factors and electro-mechanical aspects of the design]
Please be sure that I have observed over the years the all too easy way in which unscrupulous carriers have blamed the crew for anything and everything, because they are dead. In PPRuNe, I have spoken in support of those who want to change the way in which working hours are being allowed to creep up and the ever present risk of fatigue. That specific factor has been mentioned in this thread and may well have been part of why they appear (at this stage) to have failed to operate the machine within agreed parameters.