The following is just my assessment of the Airbus FBW philosophy as I have discovered that there is a lot that non-airbus pilots and other posters ignore - or chose for different reasons to ignore-.
1/- I believe, with more than ten years of experience of the airplane, that the non-moving throttle choice was the result of the envelope protection decision, and particularly the Alpha floor, in which an automatic application of go-around thrust, along with the reduction of the AoA happens.
A surprised crew would, in all probability, react first toward grabbing the T/Ls moving to full thrust, thus denying the safety philosophy of the system.
(For those still interested in the Ford Trimotor-type set-up, this can be disabled but the Habsheim accident proves that it is not generally a good idea to do so ).
2/- Quite a few comments were made about the *CLB* detent. To a certain point, I agree that *CLB* could be a misnomer...until one realises that these detents -*CLB*, *FLEX-MCT*, *TOGA* - give accurately to the pilot
the maximum thrust setting one would achieve on manual throttle on different phases of flight.
I have thought of another way to call them and failed so far.
As for throttles giving an accurate idea of the
actual engine output, let's just think of an engine failure after V1 : the throttles are walled, how do you determine which engine has quit ?..
Another example : the Air China 747 SP. All throttles were indicating full thrust, one engine had flamed out and they found out that the 74 could be barrel rolled.
And finally, in order to show the "seriousness" and the objectivity of some references given in this thread,this is a link to the articles written by Mr Alex Paterson on quite a few subjects, from religion to politics, science and aviation ( I recommend particularly the "Longbow versus crossbow, an analogy with FBW Airbus ", worth a laugh).
Alex Paterson's site.
Cheers