StS,
Under the guise of serene objectivity, your post smacks of prejudice and bias.
The main flaw of your argument is that it can be thrown back at you :
a) reduced sensory feedback channels in cockpit
I'd say that :
- The totally unusual throttle stagger was a peripheral vision cue
- The feel of one small button (the top of one throttle) is vastly fdifferent from that of a handle (the two T/Ls together)
- The direct visual cue of a very dynamic engine performance display was also a very important information.
HOWZAT for sensory feed backs ?
b) a logical "dead end street"
You are either dishonest or totally unable to read a flow chart -and in this case you're disqualified to talk about what you don't know - ; as for the auto spoiler operation my understanding is a lot simpler - and in fact, any objective observer would only see that the logic has added safety built-in.
Let's review it :
- Spoiler handle ARMED + T/Ls at or near IDLE + 1 GROUND condition --> DEPLOYMENT
- 1 T/L in REVERSE + 1 T/L at or near IDLE + 1 GROUND condition --> DEPLOYMENT
- 1 or 2 T/L in REVERSE (+) other at or near IDLE + 1 MLG strut compressed --> PARTIAL DEPLOYMENT.
The *GROUND* condition is either both struts compressed + Rad ALT < 6 ft
OR wheels spun up > 72 Kts.
Note that the *Spoiler ARMED* condition only appears once.
I'm sure they had their mind set on exactly two things: brakes and spoilers.
Boldest words I've seen lately !
Now, I don't want to hear how this or other things could have happened on a Boeing, an MD, an Embraer or a Canadair. They are different Airplanes.
Why ? Because you might find that , regardless of the type, they could have found themselves in the same predicament, and therefore destroy you anti- Airbus stance ?