What was the reason of T/R inop.?? What actions where made during maintenance?
Can you imagine (is it electrically, system, software possible) that deactivating T/R was coincident with wrong TL readouts? Is there any possibility of technical maintenance error during T/R inop. which lead to wrong readouts or different system behaviour?
Is there any technical future to protect the ABcft (Boeing) to have the T/R activated while inflight? How it is made??
What can happened when there is such a technical assurance and we had T/R on one engine inop.??
What was finally prior to disaster SOP of TAM in case of 1 TR inop. MEL because I lost the trace? Could it have an psychological input?
The question without the answer ever – did the crew had the same remembering callouts about one TR only at the previous landings?? (I would opt for continuous CVR and probably CIR)
How about different psychological scenario to presented here already. In previous landings they (more ore less together) forgot about the rule not to put the MEL restricted eng. to reverse.. (especially F/O position CPT who had made the previous landings as PF) and after being instructed by his college they both keep attention to the problem of 1TR inop. problem with too much attention?
I am curious of the two accidents with similar ending similar findings.. and no 100% prove.
How about TransAvia accident?
Do you remember Murphy’s and Fire-fighters rule of a thumb that reason is most likely be closes to the place where the most significant damages has happened.. So combined T/R inop. and wrong setting of TL leading to disaster.. is in my opinion a little too much for calling it HF errors.
Try also an Reverse Engineering in this case..
Just my 2 cents..