For God's sake.
There is no more question what would have happened, if the pilot had moved TL2 to idle. At this point we can only assume that he didn't.
My point was totally lost to most of you, obviously.
In a case, where stopping the aircraft is the desired course of action, the automatics in the AB (no, it's not the computer who should be blamed) are not allowing for GS extension, IF a pilot makes a major operational mistake (like in the TAM case). Before anybody shouts that the computer cannot account for every possible scenario, I will respond that that is exactly why there should be a MANUAL way of assisting the aircraft to STOP.
Did anyone read what I wrote earlier? It's not just a question of "simply pulling TL2 to idle", and that's it. If they had figured it out, the aircraft in question would not be in a million pieces right now. Simple, eh? The point is that there is very little in the automation side (regarding this particular scenario) that would assist the human pilot in stopping the airplane. I will not repeat the points that I consider the most important parts that should need to be improved, but I still think that it is just not right to be under the mercy of LOGIC in a panic situation to be able to stop the plane.
Some people need to think outside of their education and "business as usual" type of thinking, where even this accident would have seemed nearly impossible. We have probable evidence to support that at least two crews have now made the mistake of leaving the other TL outside of detected IDLE, and thus have lost the majority of braking power as the result. Without any other means of correcting the situation, other than finising the one missing bit from the logic loop that is set incorrectly. And that is too much to ask from a human being in a situation where logic is tossed out the window.
Tero