Originally Posted by slip and turn
What chance do mere pilots have of fully understanding it before they go to work today?
The normal operations and also what to do when a fault with the thrust control system is indicated isn't too hard to understand, and pilots have checklists (and/or ECAM procedures) for most cases that guide them through the situation.
The particular case that puzzles me is an abnormal situation, in which an "unvoluntary A/THR disconnect" occurs. Pilots wouldn't need to know anything other than
that it did occur and what to do about it (signalled by the FMA and ECAM messages "THR LK" and "THRUST LEVERS .... MOVE"). The internal workings aren't in the FCOM, and neither should they be, since this is the "operating" manual. The only information on this I could get was from the Airbus response in the Appendix of the GE 536 (Taipei over-run) report. It is very concise, and I have to read and re-read it to fully understand.
I still noticed another thing: Unvoluntary A/THR disconnect should produce a single chime; A/THR disconnected at or around 18:48:29, but no chime is in the CVR transcript. Maybe only an oversight in the transcription.
but you Bernd are a member of a world leading working group of scientists, are you not, whose main field of expertise is Safety of Computers and Automation in Commercial Aircraft Systems?
I feel flattered, and I would certainly say that PBL is world-leading in this domain, and I am honoured to work with him
