Mumbo Jumbo,
Well, sorry to have wasted your time. Please accept my apologies.
All the same, there have been widely varying opinions about the effect of no spoiler extension on landing distance and those differing opinions have been supported by the available technical documentation. For me, trying to find a rational answer to that question was worthwhile and for some others, you'll not I posted a warning at the start, the discussion might be of interest.
Any Airbus, or Boeing pilot for that matter, will have reached the exact same conclusions without all that effort simply because we know that not retarding a thrust lever and not applying brakes for so long on a short, wet runway combined with the fact that there were no ground spoilers will ineviably lead to an overrun.
Not so sure about reaching the exact same conclusions, but yes, indeed any idiot, let alone an Airbus or Boeing pilot, could tell one that.
The initial question that I was attempting to answer was Sdruvss's question: "
without spoillers and just one reverse, is it possible to stop on a short runway only applying brakes?" It's an important one, especially if you consider the various techniques being advocated in past posts should it occur. The answer is also not exactly obvious, in this case I didn't know, and I'll wager that you couldn't answer for your aircraft at the drop of a hat either. Having had to go that far, the last little bit relating to what the overall stopping distance might be didn't seem much of a stretch, and the result is very interesting when compared to the actual runway dimensions.
Long academic summaries do not explain the most important part of this investigation which is the human factors element
I would agree with you, in fact I did some maybe 400 odd posts ago. What human factors issues there are related to why the Captain did not retard the thrust lever (if that proves to be so) is one of the two most critical questions to be answered in my opinion.
...the failure to apply manual braking for 11 seconds are all secondary.
I have to disagree with you strongly there. Every pilot makes mistakes, we all know that. How we manage and mitigate our mistakes is as critical as avoiding the mistake in the first place. In this case it seems a very big mistake was made. But it was still a mistake the effect of which, even without recognition of the error, could have been reduced to a very substantial degree if the corrective actions relating to Loss of Braking were applied. The purpose of all the pointless analysis was to seek a reasoned answer to the question: If they didn't correct their mistake but made every logical effort to mitigate it, would the outcome have been the same? Again a question for which the answer is not exactly obvious given this airfield's dimensions.
In any event, those procedures and mitigating actions don't seem to have taken place as would have been expected even though there's clear evidence that the first symptom, lack of normal spoiler deployment, was recognized within only a couple of seconds. So, why the corrective actions didn't take place is every bit as much a central question as why the initiating error occurred, assuming it did in the manner widely assumed to be the case.
All the same, I will keep your wise council in mind when debating what is worth the bandwidth and what isn't.
Regards,
ELAC
PS:
All the meanderings by people with usernames that make them sound like they are Airbus or Boeing experienced pilots but are more likely just enthusiastic observers or enthusiasts, actually detract from the quality of the debate on this thread
Not sure where you are going with that one, but I will say that some usernames are very instructive regarding the quality of comment to be expected. Looking forward to more of your finely honed contributions.