I agree TP, it is strange and we are all trying to figure out why any of both pilots didn t notice what was wrong and didn t repeat the sequence of actions to get the intended result. Could it be that it was the extra stress at CGH (1. short runway 2. wet and slippery 3. one REV inop) that blurred their brain?
We know that the junior TAM pilot (ex 737) was PNF. Could it be that he was better or more recently informed/trained about A320 SOP with one REV inop than his senior checkairman? (he performed SOP at Porto Alegre on the previous leg) Could it be that the PF checkairman got confused by the call 'one REV op only' - and didn t ask further because of landing stress or ranking - and slid his hand from both to just one throttle, thereby forgetting to pull the other one to idle? And/or was he preoccupied with the extra thrust the engine with the inop rev would give him on this runway if he reversed it to max?
Moreover, I think that the translation issue is important here to understand the CVR tansscript better. I haven' t seen the original Portuguese text yet.
And another question: the 'increasing engine noise': wouldn't that immediately surprise any pilot? it came before REV thrust and, supposing it was the other engine going to CLB, that noise is in any case quite different from a REV going into max.. When you fly an ac as long as the PF did, surely you know each and every noise the thing makes, and you would immediately be alarmed by an engine spooling up at TD, wouldn't you?
So many questions, so little answers. The effort we are putting in here somehow conforts me. It is all about understanding and trying to avoid repetitions of this terrible accident...