EMIT,
however I disagree strongly on some of your statistic conclusions.
My statistical conclusions were that there weren't any.
I hope I was clear on that.
[Under the assumption of 1 landing with TR INOP in every thousand landings] there has been 1 accident per 17.000 flights with T/R de-activated, arithmatically speaking.
You find that a "disturbing rate". I don't know. I find that because of their similarities these accidents are worth considering together in detail. But of course each accident individually is worth considering in detail, so that is not saying much.
Moreover, ....... they all happened as a result of mishandling the thrust lever of the engine with the thrust lever de-activated. All with Autothrust active untill the flare. A serious issue from Man Machine interface standpoint
Consider also that in all these cases the pilots did not follow SOPs, and that at least one of the SOPs they did not follow was a memory item. Indeed one could consider the MMI. And one must consider the "Pilot-SOP interface" also.
And training and recurrency checks. As well as how the crew managed their task distribution. These phenomena are all potentially involved.
And let's not forget that the reason we have 1,500 messages on this thread in 3+ weeks is primarily that the EMAS at the end of 35L was vertical! Because if there is one thing certain in the world of aviation mishaps, it is that someone is going to run off the end of a runway again sometime.
PBL