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Old 6th Aug 2007, 20:16
  #1266 (permalink)  
skallas
 
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Estonia
Age: 54
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ELAC:

one engine is being reversed with the plane on the ground command the other one to idle if it’s not doing the very same + uncommanded reverser deployment after V1 on takeoff = YOU'RE DEAD!

It's not as easy as it might seem to define the correct logic for situations such as this.
Actually it is. You and others who say that the plane should always give you commanded thrust even when the request looks unreasonable (one reverse one forward), you miss the fact that the AB logic ALREADY KNOWS that the 2. throttle was forgotten in climb detent, that it is not representing pilot's intentions:

Notice that when thrust lever is left in CLB detent during ATHR disconnect, the power will NOT start to rise towards climb power, it stays at the last ATHR commanded power UNTIL the pilot moves the lever. From that point onward, the computer will again consider the lever to be reflecting pilots intentions. Until s/he moves it, it assumes it was forgotten there.

The computer already ACTS based on the assumption that L2 lever was unintentionally left in CLB detent. It just isn't consistent in ingnoring the physical lever position. It ignores its position regarding the thrust but it does not ignore it regarding the logic that prevents spoilers to deploy. That kind of dischord should not be there.

IF it was consistent with the logic of ignoring the lever position, but would again start to act based on its position after pilot moves it (to TOGA for example), then it would NOT kill you in any other scenario. You could still command the plane to do whatever you want. And you'd still get the spoilers and autobrakes after selecting one reverse (which cuts ATHR off).

So. My revised list of what I would think AB engineers should change:
1. continue "Retard" calls while at least one lever above idle and brakes and/or reversers on.
2. warn about the same on ECAM
(i.e. changes that are already implemented in newer software)
and 3: ignore the thrust lever position in all decision-making while it's position is being ignored for thrust determination because it was left in CLB detent during ATHR disconnect.
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