I recounted a story in my only previous post in this thread about how a few mm made all the difference.
In this case, it appears 7.5 degrees of No 2 thrust lever movement would have been enough to avoid this accident (amongst other things).
How many times have the pilots on this thread incorrectly set an altimeter setting, only to have it picked up by their colleague, incorrectly entered a de-rate, only to have it picked up by their colleague.....
Small numbers have
big impacts in this profession.
Whilst the report on this accident will, no doubt, run to hundreds of pages, simple errors of omission or commission can spoil your day.
To the Boeing
luddites amongst us (I'm a Boeing pilot), there was nothing (technical malfunction notwithstanding) stopping the pilots retarding the second thrust lever was there?
And I certainly agree with the analysis already advanced that suggests when the system encounters an ambiguous intention/demand, then, the logic should give an output that correlates exactly with the system state vector, incongruous as that might be.
To me, that is evidence of a very clever system indeed, and on the day, it is starting to look like everything was working as intended.
Does
Occam's Razor apply in aircraft investigation?
