from the times wire service (LA times)
"Maia said aircraft equipment failure had not been ruled out, and that it was possible the pilots had shifted the throttle lever correctly but that the plane's computer had failed to respond."
For a moment, let us give the benefit of the doubt to the men and not the machine.
we must have options for this scenario.
I believe my little checklist would have prevented some if not all deaths in this case and that all pilots must have in their little bag of tricks all sorts of options.
bomarc,
My comment was based on the reported content of the Airbus AIT by Hand Solo in post #1070, the content of which is now confirmed with TripleBravo's posting of the latest AIT. The exact report turns out to be "
The engine 2 throttle is recorded in the Climb position and remained in this position to the end of recording."
Based on this, there is perhaps a remote possibility of the failure being something other than the thrust lever accidentally being left in the climb detent, but the probability that the thrust lever was left in the climb detent is very, very high. I don't have current access to an A320 FCOM but the alternative scenario would require something like the simultaneous failure of both TLA sensors and both channels of the engine's FADEC or both of the SFCC's (Slat/Flap Control Computers). Still, that's a probability, not a certainty. Hopefully the investigation will answer this question for us.
On a general level, and leaving aside the physical obstruction case (which there is no supporting evidence of as yet in this instance) there's an awful lot of concurrent failures that would have to happen before the procedure you described would become the necessary set of steps to save the situation. In practice it would likely be about a 99% probability that the symptoms: No Effective Deceleration, No Ground Spoiler and No Autobrake would come about because 1 thrust lever has not been retarded to idle. So, the best training in my opinion would be:
1-Treat the most severe symptom first - establish maximum braking and reverse to stop the aircraft, as per Airbus' current memory item.
2-Confirm the most likely source of the problem - are both TL's at Idle (again as per the current memory item)? If not - Max available reverse on both engines.
Creating a more complex checklist such as the one you suggest:
Maintain directional control with rudder pedals
flaps-config 3
manually select speedbrakes extend
maximum manual toe brakes
both engines, fuel cutoff levers/switches-CUTOFF
to cater to the <1% case would probably create more problems than it solves.
For example, in the procedure as you proposed it, applying the brakes comes 4th in order of priority where in practice I would suggest that establishing the most effective and certain means of deceleration has to be the first priority 100% of the time unless an immediate decision to reject the landing is made. If we were to tell a pilot to memorize this and carry it out any time there is a lack of effective deceleration, what are the chances that the distraction of attempting to move the flap lever and then extend the speedbrake will delay or prevent the pilot from applying maximum manual braking? Will the PF do it or will he command the PM to do it? If so, time lag. If the PF does it, how will that work if the PF is the F/O? If only the Capt. does it will he also take control of the aircraft? If not will his actions distract the F/O from maximum braking? Will any or all of these questions increase the number of times that a aircraft is not stopped successfully for a lack of deceleration event versus the current procedure?
For a moment, let us give the benefit of the doubt to the men and not the machine.
When analyzing accidents no one, man or machine should be provided with "the benefit of the doubt" where there is any chance of discerning the the facts and the reasons for why things happened. All of us posters on PPRuNe are just hypothesizing based on the limited information available to us, and most certainly my thoughts are not to "convict" the pilots of the "crime" any more than I think that there is merit in the ongoing attempts here to hang the accident on the Airbus' non-moving thrust lever system.
My comments are simply my thoughts as to what I think the critical issues to examine should be based on the information introduced by the authorities so far. If I've phrased any of them as being conclusions as opposed to observations contingent on the facts stated being true, well, I've written it wrong. Whether the actions of the crew or the aircraft were appropriate or reasonable for the exact circumstances they found themselves in is a judgment matter for the investigators to decide and certainly beyond me based on what is known up to now.
Regards,
ELAC