And really, this is the way that we pilots want it to be. Almost all of the high vitriol here is about how it must be the pilot who controls the aircraft and not the computer. In this event it seems the aircraft gave the pilot everything he commanded through his actions (REV on #1, approach power on #2, later manual brakes when applied), the problem was that those initial actions were not sufficiently unambiguous for the system to deduce that a landing was intended and that automatic ground spoiler and braking should occur, as opposed to requiring further manual inputs from the pilot to make that happen
I believe that there is no argument here that the aircraft performed as
designed.
I am still baffled that presented with such a "not sufficiently unambiguous" situation the system,
by design, did nor raise all kind of
unambiguous warnings to the crew to make sure they would be 100% aware not to expect automatic spoiler extension, auto braking and more generally that they were doing something clearly wrong.
I understand there is some "desirable" software update that might have achieved some sort of warning but apparently it was not installed on this aircraft. I would be really interested into the logic that precluded this upgrade to be categorized as
urgent and
mandatory.