hmmm... Elac,
If the latest information here quoting the Airbus AIT is accurate, then though the apparent failure of the PF to retard the TL2 to idle is the initiating factor for the accident, the fact of whether the TL's move a la Boeing or remain fixed as per Airbus is irrelevant.
This just doesn't seem to make sense for me.
Let's see if I've got the two different concepts down correctly:
AB in auto throttle mode:
TLs stay in CLB detent while actual throttle is managed by AT.
B in auto throttle mode:
TLs move according to throttle setting commanded by AT.
Both systems in approach / landing mode:
throttle setting managed by AT all the way down to the flare where it's set to idle, AT then disconnects.
AB in flare
System calls out "RETARD", PF moves both throttle levers out of the CLB detent and into the IDLE detent.
B in flare
PF monitors TL coming down with the actual throttle setting. In the flare they will be at IDLE, no further action necessary.
Now, if I have understood the way those systems work correctly, I have to conclude that the TLs not moving is a
sine qua non for this accident. If the TLs are being brought back in accordance with the setting commanded by the AT, they will automatically end up in the IDLE position, nothing for the PF to fail.
Am I wrong that there is just no action for the PF to perform wrt the throttle levers in a conventionally designed aircraft?
If you were manually setting the thrust and leving one TL way forward, the engine would obviously not go to idle and you would just be floating along the runway until you finally realize it's time for TOGA.
I wonder how this accident could have happened with an airplane that was actually setting the throttle levers according to AT commands.
pj