STS,
I would, however, like some spotlight on the spoiler inhibiting logic, where the Warsaw accident bears some similarity.
Basically, there's a chance that the system goes into the "logical sitting duck" mode. Meaning that the logic can't come to a decision on the state change.
Just to be clear, I think along with you that all possible contributing phenomena should be scrutinised as closely as possible. I wouldn't wish you to imagine that I think otherwise.
The "logical sitting duck" mode to which you refer is known in other technical contexts (namely, harware arbitration) as a "metastable state." Maybe we could call it a Buridan state (cf. Buridan's ass), in recognition of the paper of Lamport and Palais which pointed out the theoretical existence of such states in digital systems some thirty years ago, and of Lamport's more popular-style paper recalling Buridan which he wrote on it a decade later.
There is a related issue with so-called Byzantine failures (also named and investigated by Lamport), which remained theoretical objects of interest until more recently. Kevin Driscoll's 2003 SAFECOMP paper points out that a major FBW aircraft type came within days of having its airworthiness certificate withdrawn because of a series of Byzantine failures in its FCS. A Byzantine failure occurs when two different processors take the same sensor reading to have two different values (how can that happen? I suggest reading Driscoll et al's account for a very good explanation).
There are also other kinds of failures which worry me quite a lot, such as the 2005 incident over Perth with a B777 in which a latent fault with the FCS manifested itself and almost caused the crew to lose control over pitching motions. That latent fault had been there in the FCS since the beginning.
I must admit that those kinds of things worry me, and others, really quite a lot. Because you cannot deal with them simply by keeping up to date with your SOPs.
PBL