Another AB crash due to the simple reason that the pilot DOES NOT HAVE 100% CONTROL OF HIS AIRCRAFT.And dont let any AB "pilot" with 7000 hours on type come on here and tell you any different and how wonderful it is as long as you know what its doing.Having to predict/second-guess software logic conditions at a time of stress(short wet runway) is evidence of POOR DESIGN and not about the pilot not knowing his aircraft.
At the critical time(just after touchdown),control of the aircraft was in the hands of the computer,not the pilot.The logic conditions to activate the essential retardation devices had not been met.He cant override the software and he cant deploy the spoilers manually.He has NO control.He is not a pilot,but a passenger in a runaway computerized Nintendo nightmare.
Wileydog3,in his infinite wisdom,speaks of each design(AB and conventional)having their strengths and weaknesses and that the aviator must understand them and act accordingly.Thats quite frankly bs.I am tired of wading through these pages and seeing excuses being made for the clear and unequivocal design flaws of this aircraft.By designing the pilot out of the control loop and in a naive attempt to eradicate human error from commercial aviation,they have in fact created a whole new way to crash a commercial aircraft.They've done something only the French could do;eradicate pilot error but replace it with something thats even worse.
The pilot is your last and best chance and he must have full and total control of his aircraft at all times.Unhampered by mode confusion(Melbourne incident,Strasburg crash)),over-confidence in protection systems(Toulouse),or unnecessarily complex logic conditions(Warsaw and now Sao Paolo).No tactile feedback and an over-reliance on the optical channel complete the sorry picture.